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5. CollateralInheritance Tax.-" The right to take property
by devise or descent is the creature of the law and secured and
protected by its authority. The legislature might, if it saw proper,
restrict the succession to a decedent's estate, either by devise or
descent to a particular class of his kindred, say to his lineal
descendants and ascendants :" Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Gratt. 422.
LEE, J., p. 430. When the legislature requires a certain per
centage of the estate passing by devise or descent to collateral
kindred, it is called a collateral inheritance tax, or succession tax.
It is a tax upon the civil privilege of taking the property devised
or descended. Where the domicile of the decedent is in one state,
and the situs of the property in another, the question arises in which
state is the tax imposed. The general rule is that wherever the.
owner of the property is domiciled, there a tax may be imposed on
the succession, although the property may be situated in another
state: Short'8 Estate, 16 Penna. St. 63. fit where the state has
control over neither the domicile of the decedent or his property,
it cannot impose the tax: .Hood's .Estate, 21 Penna. St. 106.
In the first of these cases, Short resided in Philadelphia, owned
large sums invested in stocks of corporations of other states, in
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bonrds of the state of Kentucky, and a bank deposit in the state of
New York. This property was held liable to the succession tax in
Pennsylvania on the principle that the situs of personal property
follows the domicile of the owner. In the second case, Itood
was born in Philadelphia in 1786, went to Cuba in 1814, became established in business there; in 1817 formed partnership with persons residing in Philadelphia, and had correspondents there; he lived in Cuba until his death, made occasional
visits to Philadelphia, and died in France in 1850, while on a visit
for his health. lie had estate in Pennsylvania, and large estates
in Cuba. Legacies to a large amount were given to persons residing in Pennsylvania. The executor paid the collateral inheritance
tax on all the property in Pennsylvania, but refused to pay on the
legacies derived from property in Cuba. The executor was sustained, the court deciding that where neither the personal property
taxed, nor the domicile of its owner is within the state at the time
of his death, such property is not subject to the collateral inheritance tax. These cases do not conflict with the doctrine that the
state in which ancillary administration of an estate is granted may
impose a collateral inheritance tax on all property situated in the
state: Alv;any v. Powell, 2 Jones' Eq. 51 (ante, p. 71), n7hich has
- visible, tangible existence, or even upon debts, which can only
be collected by the ancillary administrator, who has the legal title
to them: St. Louis County v. Taylor's Administrator. 47 Mo.
594; The Attorney-General v. Hope, 1 0., M & R. 530; 8 Bligh
44. Nor do the cases last cited maintain a doctrine that would
anake it proper to have sustained the tax in Hood's .Estate, upon
the legacies derived from. the property in Cuba. When the
property is of such a character that it passes by delivery, it is subject to the collateral inheritance tax or probate duty where it is
situated: Attorney-General v. Bowens, 4 M. & W. 171. This
tax is due when settlement is made with the legatees, although
.the estate is not fully settled: Attorney-General v. Pierce, 6
Jones' Equity 144.
G. Public Securities and Negotiable Instruments.-The state
bonds and bonds of municipal bodies and circulating notes of
banks, which are treated as property where they are, and pass by
delivery, are the subject of taxation wherever they are found, in the
same manner as chattels: FIELD, J., in State Tax on Pforeiqnheld Bonds, 15 Wall. 824. Probate duty in England, is mea-
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sured by the property within the jurisdiction of the cou:t : Attorvey-General v. .Diniond, 1 Or. & Jer. 370. Where a portion of
the estate of the decedent was composed of Russian, Danish and
Dutch bonds, which were marketable securities, transferable by
delivery only, and as to which it was never necessary to do any
act whatsoever out of the kingdom of England, in order to make
a transfer of any of the said bonds valid, they were held liable to
the probate duty: Attorney-General v. .Bowens, 4 Al. &W. 190.
Lord ABINGER says: "No ordinary in England could perform
any act of administration within his diocese, with respect to debts
due from persons resident abroad, or with respect to shares or interests in foreign funds payable abroad, and incapable of being transferred here; and therefore no duty would be payable on the
probate or letters of administration in respect of such effects. But,
on the other band, it is clear that the ordinary could administer
all chattels within his jurisdiction ; and if an instrument is
created of a chattel nature, capable of being transferred by acts
done here, and sold for money here, there is no reason why the
ordinary or his appointee should not administer that species of
property. Such an instrument is in effect a saleable chattel, and
follows the nature of other chattels as to the jurisdiction to grant
probate:" Attorney-General v. Bowens, 4 M. & W. 190. But
where the public securities, owned by the decedent who was domticiled in England, were of such a character that they were not
transferable by delivery, but only transferable in the state where
they were issued, they were held not liable to such duty: Attorney-General v. Dinond, 1 Cr. & Jer. 356; Attorney-General v.
.Hope, 1 C., M. &R. 530; 8 Bligh 44. The securities in the first
case were called rentes, inscribed in the great book of the debt
public of France; and in the second, they were registered stocks of
the state of New York. The same principle iq contained in those
cases, which hold that state or municipal bonds which are required
by various states to be deposited by foreign insurance, with the
treasurer or other officer, are liable to taxation as property in the
state: British Com. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioners, 40 N. Y.
(4 Keyes) 303; People v. M-ome Insurance Co., 29 Cal. 533. It
is to be observed, that the stocks which were held liable to probate
duty in England, might have been held liable on the principle, that
the situs of personal property is that of its owner, but the same
principle woald apply in the cases in which they were held not lia-
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ble; the idea upon which they are based is that when the evidence
of the debt is such that it passes by delivery, then the situs of the
evidence of the debt is the situs of the debt, and it is taxable there.
But where it is necessary thai the evidence of the debt should
be in the state of the debtor, in order to transfer the title to it, it
is taxable in the state of the debtor, which is in accord with the
Missouri and North Carolina cases on the subject : Ante, § 3, p. 69,
etc. This principle extends to all negotiable instruments which pass
by delivery, and they should be taxed where the instruments are
situated. They are chattels personal; a negotiable note payable
to the order of an unmarried woman becomes the property of her
husband without her endorsement, it being . personal chattel, and
not a chose in action: Me.eilage v. Jlalioway, 1 B. & Ald. 218.
7. Steamers and Sailing Vessels.-The domicile of a vessel is its
home port, or port at which it is required to be registered by the
Acts of Congress, and this is the port nearest to the place 'here
the owner or owners reside : 1 Stat. at Large 288, Bright. Dig. 824,
pl. 3. The name of the vessel and of the port to which she belongs
is required to be painted on her stern, on a black ground, in white
letters of not less than three inches in length. Where an ocean
steamer, oined and registered in New York, and regularly plying
between Panama and San Francisco and ports in Oregon, remaining in San Francisco no longer than is necessary to land and receive passengers and cargo, and in Benicia only for repairs and
supplies, a tax assessed by the state of California and paid, was
recovered back, upon the ground that the steamer was not property
within the state of California: .h2ays v. The Pacific Mail Steamsip Co., 17 How. 596. NLSo, J. "Whether the vessel, leaving
her home port for trade and commerce, visits, in the course of her
voyage or business, several ports, or confines her operations in the
carrying trade to one, are questions that will depend upon the
profitable returns of the busihess, and will furnish no more evidence that she has become a part of the personal property within
the state, and liable to taxation, at one port than at others. She
is within the jurisdiction of all or any one of them, temporarily,
and for a purpose wholly excluaing the idea of permanently abiding in the state, or changing her home port. We are satisfied that
the state of California had no jurisdiction over these vessels for
the purpose of taxation ; they were not property abiding within its
limits, so as to become incorporated with the other personal pro-
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perty of the state; they were there but temporarily, engaged in
lawful trade and commerce, with their situs at the home port where
the vessels belonged and where the owners were liable to be taxed
for the capital invested, and where taxes had been paid." A
vessel registered in the port of New York, that nearest her owner's
residence, one of a regular daily line of steamers between Mobile
and New Orleans, is not taxable in Alabama: l.forgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471. The fact that such vessel is enrolled by her
master as a coaster at Mobile, Alabama, and that her license as a,
coaster is renewed from year to year, does not affect her registry
or ownership in New York, nor make her liable to taxation as personal property in the state of Alabama.
In the cases which have been noticed on this subject, the home
port and residence of the owner of the vessel were in a different
state from that of the vessel, and the vessel being temporarily in
the state in which she was used, was not liable to taxation in
such state. But where the owner of a steamer resides in the
state and the vessel is engaged on the waters of a river of that
state, wholly within the state, the vessel is taxable in such state,
notwithstanding she is registered and enrolled as a coasting vessel
under the Acts of Congress. And it would seem that a vessel so
engaged would be taxable in the state on whose waters she was
plying, even if the owner resided in another state: Battle v.
c poration of 3obile, 9 Ala. 234; Alinturn v. Hays, 2 Cal. 590.
The charter of the city of New Albany allowed it to tax all real
and personal property within the city. Meekin, a resident of
the city, was part owner of a steamboat, enrolled at Louisville,
and which touched occasionally at New Albany; a tax imposed
on Meekin for his share of the boat was held illegal ; it was not
property within the city; and in a similar case, it was held the
situs of a vessel is the place of its registration and port from which
it regularly departs and returns: The Cit, of -Yew Albany v.
.Aeekin, 8 Ind. 481 ; Wilkey v. The City of Pekin, 19 Ill. 160,
s. P. The city of St. Louis, by its charter, had precisely the
same power as New Albany. The St. Louis Ferry Company
was incorporated in Illinois, and bad an office there; the company were engaged in carrying passengers and freight across
the river from St. Louis, Missouri, to East St. Louis in Illinois.
The boats only touched at the wharf in St. Louis, as one of the
termini of the voyage, and were not allowed to remain there more
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than ten minutes, in pursuance of an ordinance of the city. When
not in actual use, they were laid up in Illinois ; their pilots and
engincers resided there; their real estate and warehouse on it were
there. The boats were enrolled in St. Louis; the company had an
office there; its president, vice-president and principil officers lived
there; the stockholders mainly resided there, and none of them in
Illinois; the ordinary meetings of the directors were held, and its
moneys received and disbursed, and corporate seal kept in St.
Louis. The company paid to the city of St. Louis an annual ferry
license; it erected, by permission of the city, wharf-boats at its
wharf or public landing; it paid wharfage to the city at a stipulated
annual amount, it was assessed and paid taxes on the value of the
wharf-boats within the city limits. The city of St. Louis laid also
a tax on the value of the ferry-boats, which was refused, on the
ground that these boats were not property "within the city."
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the company was liable
for the tax on the ferry-boats: St. Louis v. The Ferry Company,
40 Mo. 580. This decision was overruled by the Supreme Court
of the United States: St. Louis v. The Terry company, 11 Wall.
423.
The latter court held that a corporation is a citizen of.thestate
which created it ; that jurisdiction of either person or property is
necessary to the exercise of the taxing-power, and while it is true,
as a general rule, that personal property follows the person, yet
this doctrine does not stand in the way of the taxing power in the
locality where the property has an actual situs. The enrolment
of the vessel throws little light, upon the question of actual situs,
because she is required to be registered at her home port, and
-where her home port is depends upon the locality of the owner's
residence, and not upon the place of enrolment. SwAYNE, J. :
"The owner was, in the eye of the law, a citizen of.Illinois, and
from the inherent law of its nature could not emigrate or become
a citizen elsewhere. As the boats were laid up on the Illinois
shore, when not in use, and the pilots and engineers who ran them
lived there, that locality, under the circumstances, must be taken
to be their home port. They did not so abide within the city of
St. Louis as to become incorporated with and form part of its personal property. Hence they were beyond the jurisdiction of the
authorities by which the taxes were assessed, and the validity of
the taxes cannot be maintained."
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8. Goods in hands of Consignee, or in Transitz.-Where goods
are sent from one state to another merely for sale, the rule that
personal property follows the person is not so far modified by their
actual situs as to make them liable to taxation in the hands' of the
consignee: The Parker iMills v. The Uommissioners of Taxes, 23
N. Y. 242, 245; McCormick v. Fitch, 14 Minn. 252; People v.
Coleman, 4 Cal. 46.1 The case of The ParkerMills announces
the principle laid down, but it arose upon the construction of a
statute, requiring "all persons and associations doing business in
the state of New York, as merchants, bankers or otherwise, either
as principal or partners, whether special or otherwise, and not residents of the state, to be assessed and taxed on all sums invested
in any manner in said business, the same as if they were residents
of the state." The Parker Mills was a foreign corporation, manufacturing nails in the states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island.
It had a depot and agent in the city of New York, to whom it
transmitted nails for sale. Its only business within the state consisted in making such sales, the proceeds of which were remitted
at once to the corporation in Massachusetts; and where sales were
upon credit, the securities received were sent to the corporation for
collection. Annual sales, $300,000; value of nails in store on
day of assessment, $10,000. It is said by the court that the
object of this statute was to reach foreign corporations and persons engaged as partners of commercial or other firms, who resided
in New Jersey or Connecticut, enjoyed the fruits of a profitable
business carried on in New York, and yet, by reason of the rule
that personal property is deemed to follow the person, they escaped
taxation in New York. In these the investment of the funds has
more or less of permanency. It is not the mere transit of property through the state for the purposes of a market. The court
likens the case to that of a drover, who transports his herds of
cattle to New York for sale, who may have his field or yard for
keeping his cattle and his herdsman to take care of them. It is
easy to perceive the difference between the case of the drover put,
and that of the merchants doing business in New York, as to their
permanency; but the difference between a merchant engaged in a
1

See also North v. Fayetteville, I Winston's (N. C.), Equity 70; Frantk'sAp-

peal, 52 Penna. St. 367 ; Duer v. Small, 4 Blatch. C. C. 263, as to taxing business
in one state when a person resides in another; also 19 Wall. 502-3, approving
principle of New York statute quoted.

LIMITATIONS ON TAXING POWER

regular business and that of The Parker Mills Company, as to
permanency, it is hard to perceive. But I do not understand the
court as deciding that a statute taxing the property of a company
carrying on such a business as The Parker Mills Company, would
be void, because the situs of the property was not sufficiently permanent to make it property within the jurisdiction of the state,
and-to modify the rule that personal property follows the person;
that would be to overrule Hoyt v. The Commissioners of Taxes:
23 N. Y. 224. They merely decide that the company was not
taxable under the statute named.
In Transitu.-Goods in transit to a market are not liable to
taxation in the state through which they pass to arrive at a market for sale: State v. Bagle, 34 N. J. L. (5 Yroom) 425; Conley
v. Chedic, 7 Nevada 836; Carrier v. Gordon, 21 Ohio 605. The
case in New Jersey arose under a statute which makes " a person
liable to be taxed in the township or ward in which he resides,
for all personal estate in his possession or under his control as
trustee, guardian, executor, administrator or agent." An assessment was made on coal lying on a piei at Elizabethport, under
the control of an agent. The coal was the property of a company
doing business in Pennsylvania, was mined on their land in Pennsylvania, and sent by the cars of the Central Railroad to Elizabethport, to be there shipped by water to other markets for the
purposes of sale. It was the custom of the company, when the
coal arrives at Elizabethport, to have it separated according to
sizes, and when a cargo of one size is obtained, it is shipped 'to
points in New England, or up the Hudson river, as soon as a
vessel can be chartered. None of the coal is sold for consumption
at Elizabethport. DuPUE, J., delivering the opinion of the court,
said: "The duties of the agents were simply to obtain and transmit orders to their principals, and superintend reshipment when
delivered. The property was not in the state under such circumstances as to be liable to taxation here. The power of the state to
tax subjects of commerce, where their transit for the purpose of
commerce has ceased, and they have become incorporated and
mixed up with the mass of property in the community, is well
settled. But that a tax on the property belonging to a citizen of
another state, in its transit to market in other states, which is
delayed in this state, not for the purposes of sale, but merely for
separation and assortment, for convenience of shipment to its desti-
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nation, is a tax on commerce among the states, is too plain to
require argument. It is not the mode in which the tax is imposed,
nor the person against whom it is assessed, that determines whether
the taxation is within the power of the state. If a tax can be
levied on the quantity on the wharf within the state when the
assessment is made, why not on every ton sent across the state
throughout the year? A change in the mbde and time of assessment is all that would be necessary to accomplish that purpose."'
In the Nevada case, wood cut in California, owned by a citizen of
that state, thrown into Carson river, and passing D. county in
Nevada to find a market in 0. county in Nevada, was held not
taxable in D. county, under a statute requiring all property in the
county a specified period to be taxed there, because the wood was
in D. county at the-period specified. In the Ohio case cited, the
statute makes all tangible property in the state liable to taxation,
whether owned by resident or non-resident. The property which
was claimed to be exempt from taxation, because in transitu to
another state, was property in Ohio, sold to a non-resident and
merely awaiting the opening of navigation for its removal. It
was held liable to taxation. The court say: "If the property is,
at the time the tax attaches, in transitu, either through the state,
or from a point in the ttate to one out of it, it is not within the
state in the sense of the statute. Such was not the condition of
this property; it had a situs when the tax attached. Simple
puqrchase with intent to remove cannot change it."
9. Double Taxation, or Taxation on Credits.-The equality or
justice of the policy of taxing credits, is a question upon which
political economists, legislators and courts differ. A commission
from the legislature of New York, in their report on this subject,
condemn the practice of taxing credits, while a similar commission
from Connecticut and one from New Jersey hold it to be a just
and equitable mode of taxation: Report of Commissioner Wells
et al., 1871, to the New York Legislature, pp. 72-3. Mr. Walker,
in his work, demonstrates the fairness of this system of taxation:
Walker, Science of Wealth, ed. 1872, pp. 361-2-3.
As to the mortgagee, or, in case of a sale of land on credit
I Citing Erie Railroad v. State, 31 N. J. L. (2 Vroorn) 531, where it was decided that a transit duty of three cents on every passenger, and two cents on every
ton of freight, transported by corporations through the state, was void.
VOL. XXIV.-18

LIMITATIONS ON TAXING POWER

without mortgage, the holder of the notes for purchase-money, it
is settled in several states that the taxation of the credits is not
double taxation: The People v. Jlhodes, 15 Ill. 301 ; State v. Manchester, 1 Dutcher 531; People v. Whartenby, 38 Cal. 461; State
v. Williamson, 33 N. J. L. (4 Vroom) 77. The case in California
decided it was not double taxation as to the mortgagee, but the
question was reserved- as to the mortgagor: People v. MeCrary,
34 Cal. 459, also decides the same principle. In a subsequent
case it was decided that where the mortgagee paid the tax on
the debt, the mortgagor cannot complain of double taxation; it
does not affect him. There was an intimation that perhaps the
statute, which only allows the indebtedness of a person to be
deducted from the amount of solvent demands, in ascertaining
the amount of personal property to be taxed, conflicted with that
provision of the Constitution requiring property to be assessed at
its value, inasmuch as the value of the. land in the hands of the
mortgagor is his interest in the land, less the debt: Lick v. Austin,
43 Cal. 590. This question was most elaborately discussed in a
late case in California; the former decisions were reviewed and
sustained by a divided court: Savings J. Loan Society v. Austin,
46 Cal. 415. CROCKETT and NILES, JJ., thought the taxation of
the property mortgaged and of the debt secured was double taxation.
The Savings and Loan Society was a banking corporation, with a
capital of $500,000, which was invested in U. S. bonds. All
the solvent debts due the corporation were for moneys deposited
by depositors in the bank, which were loaned out at interest, to be
repaid the depositors when returned by the borrowers, with interest accumulating from time to time. These loans were secured
by mortgage. This corporation was assessed for solvent debts at
$7,968,740, the amount of their loans. It was claimed that the
depositors bad been likewise assessed and had paid taxes on the
deposits. A majority of the court, while holding the opinion just
stated, thought it would have been a case of double taxation, if the
record had sustained the claim set up that the depositors had been
assessed and paid taxes on the deposits. BELCHER, J., says:
11When money is deposited in a savings bank, to be loaned out
for the benefit of the depositor, if it is taxed to the depositor, and
the bank has loaned out the money and is taxed upon the note
and mortgage, it is double taxation. In this case it does not appear that the taxes had been paid by the depositors on any of their
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deposits, and therefore the question of double taxation does not
arise. It must appear that the tax has been once paid or tendered
by some one." This case is cited in a later case in the same state,
as deciding that solvent debts are liable to taxation: People v.
Ashbury, 46 Cal. 523.
Where property is taied in one state, on account of the residence of the decedent, and in another because the evidences of
debt in the hands of the ancillary administrator is in the latter state,
the fact that it will be thus subject to double taxation is not
weighed at all by the courts of the latter state: St. Louis County
v. Taylor's Administrator,47 Mo. 594. Such taxation may be
unjust, but the court cannot disregard the law because it has that
effect: Tallman v. Butler County, 12 Iowa 534 ; approved in 28
Iowa 370 ; Toll Bridge Company v. Osborn, 35 Conn. 7. But if a
certain kind of property is clearly taxable under one section of
the statute, the statute will be so construed as not to make the
same property taxable again under another section of the statute:
Savings Bank v. Portsmouth, 52 N. H. 17.
10. Conclusion as to Taxable Situs of Personal Propert.-We
conclude that the situs of personal property for the purposes
of taxation depends in a great measure upon the nature of the
property.
(a.) If it be chattels, which have a tangible existence, they are
taxed in the locality in which they are situated.
(b.) Evidences of debt, such as state stocks and bonds of municipal corporations, transferable by delivery, and indeed all negotiable instruments which are of a chattel nature, are taxable where
the evidence of the debt is actually situated.
(c) But chiattels which are in transit from one state to another,
seeking a market, or which are in the hands of a consignee for sale
merely, are not subject to taxation in the state where they are
actually situated, but in that of the owner.
(d.) Debts not negotiable are taxable where the owner resides;
they follow his person.
(e.) But where it is necessary, in case of the death of the owner,
to have administration in the state of the debtor, the legal title
being in the ancillary administrator or executor, the assets of the
estate recoverable in the ancillary forum may be taxed by that
state. But legacies, the proceeds of property situated in the domiciliary forum, although passing to legatees through the hands of

